An oil pipeline worker who was seriously injured by the pipe-laying machine he was operating cannot pursue liability claims against his employer as the current seller of the machines.

In Scott v. Key Energy Services Inc., the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in St. Louis held Wednesday that the exclusive remedy provision of the North Dakota Workers Compensation Act barred the employee’s claims.

Key Energy provides oil and gas pipeline maintenance and uses an apparatus designed and manufactured by Hydra-Walk Inc. that allows operators to pick up and lay down pipe. In 2008, Key Energy merged with Hydra-Walk, becoming owner of the Hydra-Walk system patents and equipment.

In 2013, Key Energy hired Lukeus Scott as a Hydra-Walk operator, and two weeks after he started, he suffered injuries to his spine, right hand, legs and internal organs when the Hydra-Walk system he was operating overturned and crushed him. He sought workers compensation benefits and was paid more than $340,000 over a five-year period.

In April 2018, Mr. Scott filed claims of product liability and negligence against Key Energy and Hydra-Walk, alleging that the system was defective, unreasonably dangerous and caused his injuries. He argued that Key Energy, as the successor to Hydra-Walk, assumed liability for the design, manufacture, sale and leasing of the systems. Key Energy moved for summary judgment on the basis that the state’s workers compensation act was Mr. Scott’s exclusive remedy.

A district court granted the motion, holding that Mr. Scott’s claims were barred by the exclusive remedy, and Mr. Scott appealed.

The appellate court affirmed the decision. The court dismissed Mr. Scott’s claims that Hydra-Walk was a third party, noting that the merger took place five years before his accident and that Hydra-Walk ceased to exist. The court also held that Mr. Scott’s argument that the dual capacity doctrine — in which an employee is able to pursue claims against the employer if that employer has second obligation independent of its primary obligation as employer — did not apply to his claims.

In a dissent, Judge Jane Kelly held that appellate court’s decision that the dual capacity doctrine did not apply “left open the possibility for an exception to the exclusive remedy rule where the employer has a distinct separate legal persona” and that the law “favors permitting (Mr.) Scott to pursue his tort claims” against his employer, as a successor to Hydra-Walk, under the dual persona exception to the exclusive remedy.